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Resumo
Nossa compreensão da governança em países em desenvolvimento é frágil e, 
frequentemente, distorcida. O fato de que os investidores estrangeiros estão 
preocupados com a governança é importante, porém, muitos observadores se 
limitam   a   examinar   as   formas   como   a   governança   ajuda   o   mercado.   A 
governança, de fato, é importante para o desenvolvimento do mercado, mas os 
governos, às vezes, desempenham outras funções que incluem a substituição do 
mercado e proteção das normas sociais das transações do mercado. Igualmente, 
uma   noção   limitada   de   governança   e   métodos   de   medir   segurança, 
frequentemente   se   limitam   a   indicadores   quantitativos.   Tal   abordagem 
negligencia as seqüências e interações pelas quais os Estados e mercados são 
construídos e a forma única sócio-cultural pela qual a governança pode operar 
em diferentes lugares e épocas. Finalmente, é preciso estar atento às ações de 
Norte que, mesmo bem intencionadas, enfraquecem os governos do Sul. Alguns 
tipos de ajuda e comércio podem prejudicar a governança ao invés de fortalecê-
la.   Um   aspecto   fundamental   nesta   direção   é   o   impacto   dos   impostos   e 
administração tributária no Sul. Modalidades de ajuda, tais como um projeto de 
ajuda   fragmentado,   pouco   contribui   para   fortalecer   a   governança   e,   ao 
contrário,   pode   enfraquecê-la.   Além   do   mais,   a   instância   em   isenção   de 
materiais, serviços e bens adquiridos por meio da ajuda externa pode piorar a 
governança.
Palavras-Chave:  Governança;   Metodologia;   Ajuda   Internacional;   Impostos; 
Comércio.
Abstract
Our understanding of governance in developing countries is weak and frequently 
misguided.  That international donors are paying attention to governance is 
important,   but   many   observers   limit   themselves   to   the   ways   in   which 
governance enhances markets. Governance is certainly necessary for market 
development,   but governments   at times   perform   other  functions,  including 
replacing markets and protecting social norms from market transactions. In 
addition to a limited notion of governance, methods of measuring governance 
frequently limit themselves to quantitative indicators. This misses the variety of 
sequences and interactions by which states and markets are built and the 
unique socio-cultural ways in which governance is likely to operate at different 
places and times. Finally, we need to be far more aware of the way in which 
Northern actions, even guided by good intentions, weaken governance in the 
South. Certain kinds of trade and aid may actually undermine governance rather 
than enhance it. Of particular worry is Northern impact on taxes and tax 
administration in the South. Aid modalities, such as fragmented project aid, do 
little   to   enhance   governance   and   may   worsen   it.   Further,   insisting   on 
exemptions for materials, services, and incomes purchased with aid, as many 
donors do, worsens governance.
Key-Words: Governance; Methodology; International Aid; Tax; Trade.
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Introduction
In   recent   years,   there   has   been   a   welcome   shift   in   the 
international development community to pay substantive attention to 
governance.   Partly,   this   reflects   an   evolution   from   the   unrealistic 
prescriptions of market fundamentalists who did their best to get the 
state out of the way – getting prices right. Still, there are problems to 
resolve. The approach to governance remains distorted by a faith in 
markets that introduces bias into measurement. Another problem is that 
the preference for quantitative indicators ignores what we know about 
the   qualitative   and   interpretive   aspects   of   nation-building,   state-
building,   and   comparative   world   history.   Finally,   our   current 
understanding of governance ignores the ways in which actions of the 
North and the aid community act to the detriment of governance in the 
South. The lesson to be drawn is that international institutions have 
made progress since the 1980s, but we have a long way to go to 
integrate governance in a meaningful way.
Part   of   our   difficulty   lies   in   method.   In   political   science, 
methodological debates have been waged on two fronts. One front is the 
perestroika front. This battle was taken up forcefully by the perestroika 
movement of 2000, and the positions have been articulated elegantly by 
King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and Brady and Collier (2004). On one 
side stand those who would argue for a singular logic of social science 
built around formalized, deductive theorizing and quantitative testing. 
On the other side stand those who bring a diverse toolbox of techniques 
for conceptualization, causal process tracing, case understanding, and 
interpretation.
A second debate pits interpretivists against positivists, thereby 
redividing the social science community into a different set of alliances. 
On one side are those who take a relativist view of concepts and causal 
argument   and   focus   their   attention   on   the   social   construction   of 
meanings (GEERTZ, 1973). On the other side are those who take the 
process of research as an attempt to build reliable and valid measures 
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and   causal   arguments   that   can   fit   and   predict   our   observations 
(LIEBERSON, 1985).
Interestingly, people who analyze a relatively small number of 
cases   studied   comparatively   are   often   switching   partners   in   these 
debates. For example, as a political  scientist engaged in issues of 
political  economy,  I  frequently  find myself entering the perestroika 
debate   with   economist   colleagues.   They   typically   lump   me   with 
anthropologists and sociologists whose work does not begin with formal 
models and does not always test hypotheses with statistics. By contrast, 
when   I   joined   a   development   studies   institution,   I   found   myself 
frequently   interacting   with   sociologists   and   anthropologists.   They 
charged that I was like economists who are worried about obeying 
scientific procedures of reliability, validity, and objectivity. 
Like   me,   researchers   who   specialize   in   case   study   and 
comparison of a small number of cases (small-N) often find themselves 
in bed with one group when the terms of the debate go one way (Is it 
necessary   to   deductively   theorize,   quantitatively   measure,   and 
statistically test an argument to prove causality? No) and in bed with 
another group when the terms of the debate go another way (Can we 
ever know anything? Yes).
Working in the messy middle provides a particular incentive to 
bridge these three approaches. The current paper focuses on the notion 
of governance adopted by international aid organizations. These notions 
are rooted in institutional economics and represent an advance over 
previous a-political approaches to development. Yet, a market and a 
quantitative bias distorts attempts to evaluate governance, missing the 
ways in which state-building and nation-states differ across times and 
places. Finally, there is very little reflection on the role of the North in 
shaping governance in the South. If we take governance seriously, we 
must not only consider the particular way in which late-developers 
construct state capacity to reflect their own history and context, we 
must also change the way in which the North relates to the South. To 
illustrate  this argument, I examine the nature of tax relationships, 
especially those surrounding international assistance.
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Governance and Institutions
Since the 1990s bilateral and multilateral actors have introduced 
sophisticated   understandings   of  governance   to   their   development 
operations. The Millennium Development Account, the large new fund 
for United States international assistance, explicitly uses governance 
measures as criteria for eligibility; the World Bank has invested serious 
resources in the enterprise, as have regional development banks, such 
as the Interamerican Development Bank. This is a significant shift from 
the original limits of the Washington Consensus.
That Consensus was a response to the debt and inflation of the 
1980s, in which a basic suspicion of state intervention in the economy 
was reinforced by the fall of the Soviet Union. In its original formulation, 
the   Washington   Consensus   included   elements   that   paid   heed   to 
governance institutions (e.g. health and education, protect property 
rights) (WILLIAMSON, 1990). In practice, however, especially in Latin 
America, the application of the Consensus was to minimize the role of 
the state. The assumption was that a minimal state would allow markets 
to emerge naturally. 
As 1980s inflation and debt gave way to 1990s instability and 
stagnation, national governments and international institutions became 
increasingly convinced that governments needed to play essential roles 
to make markets work. This became the insight that guided attempts to 
incorporate   governance   into   development   operations.   Of   particular 
importance was the effort by Wolfensohn to highlight corruption in 
countries in which the World Bank worked, an initiative that Wolfowitz 
pursued (to his peril) and Zoellick appears ready to champion (WORLD 
BANK, 2000). The guiding intuition was that governments needed to 
provide the right institutional  environment to promote development 
(BURNSIDE and DOLLAR, 1998).
This view of institutions was shaped by institutional economics, 
which was evolving to specify the kinds of institutions that allowed 
markets to operate (e.g. NORTH, 1980; WEINGAST, 1995). My position 
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is that government enhancing markets is only an important first step. 
Markets may be useful, but they are not the sole goal of governance, 
and   governance   should   not   solely   be   evaluated   in   terms   of   its 
contribution to markets.
Market-Bias
In fact, the emphasis on markets biases the ways in which 
governance tends to be measured in two ways. First, there is a tendency 
to   assume   markets   flourish   where   governments   do   not   –   good 
governance   is   measured   as   minimal   government.   Second,   where 
government is necessary, it is only in its role of improving markets – 
ignoring functions that replace markets or protect social rules from 
market operations. 
The belief in minimal governance leads to attempts to measure 
what government does not do (e.g. red tape, corruption, barriers to 
trade). One example is the attempt to measure regulatory quality and 
rule of law, which mostly looks for evidence that regulations and legal 
rules do not complicate the work of businesses (KAUFMANN et al, 2002, 
2003, 2005). The implication, of course, is that governments that do 
less   of   these   things   automatically   allow   the   space   for   markets   to 
emerge.   This   reflects   a   desire   for   certain   policy   outcomes   (small 
government) rather than governance itself. In fact, it may ignore the 
important   ways   in   which   more   government   makes   markets   work 
(RODRIK, 1997) or governments are necessary to establish markets 
where none exist (ENSMINGER, 1996).
Spurious validation of small government measures are produced 
as an artifact of the people surveyed, such as businesspeople and risk-
rating agencies. A shared preference for small governance may be 
driving   results,   rather   than   accurate   measures   of   governance.   To 
improve such measures, the same issues would need to be asked of 
different publics (KURTZ and SCHRANK, 2007).
A second problem appears in the failure to measure instances in 
which markets are replaced by bureaucratic or social processes. The 
most   obvious   example   would   be   the   evaluation   of   East   Asian 
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developmental states. Despite attempts to interpret these as examples 
of   minimal   government   intervention   (WORLD   BANK,   1993),   most 
observers   conclude   that   these   were   cases   in   which   government 
bureaucracy substituted for market processes, getting prices wrong such 
that development could advance (AMSDEN, 2001; WADE, 1990).
Examples of social processes  substituting for market processes 
are evident in any number of policy areas in which markets offend 
cultural or social sensibilities. Many years ago, Polanyi (2001) spoke of a 
“double movement,” in which market operations and social operations 
negotiated   boundaries   over   what   can   be   bought   and   sold   (2001). 
Contemporary conflicts over religion and family structure offer examples 
of the ways in which societies define the boundaries between market 
operations and social norms. Any measure of governance needs to be 
sensitive to the capacity of the state to enforce these boundaries, which 
necessarily differ across societies.
Quantitative Insufficiency
While there is no necessary correlation between the international 
aid architecture and specific methodologies for measurement, an affinity 
for quantitative techniques has emerged. This has produced a number of 
useful quantitative databases and metadatabases (World Bank website; 
DATAGOB – IADB; Millenium Challenge Account). On the other hand, 
quantitative measures, even if conducted perfectly, have skated over 
aspects   of   governance   that   are   more   evident   in   qualitative   and 
interpretive research.
Qualitative work on governance has evolved through a series of 
classic   studies   that   is   mostly,   though   not   exclusively,   focused   on 
countries in the North, where state capacity is arguably higher (eg. 
TILLY, 1992). These studies traced the combination of factors that came 
together as rulers emerged, centralized power within a given territory, 
consolidated control, legitimated their rule, and built states. The general 
argument for using a comparative and qualitative approach to these 
questions is that contexts, sequences, and external factors vary, so it is 
only possible to understand governance by tracing the process by which 
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states emerged in each place. Otherwise, we miss the differences in the 
nature of governance in early developers, late developers, and the late-
late developers of today. This points not to single or even multiple 
dimensions, but rather to alternative combinations of dimensions, in 
which multiple paths to similar outcomes are possible (state-building, in 
this case) (RAGIN, 1987).
Interpretive work produces an approach to governance that is 
equally distinct from quantitative analysis. In fact, the end of the Cold 
War and processes  of globalization have  provoked a  resurgence  in 
interpretive and constructive approaches to governance, much of it 
working out of international relations approaches to norms and regimes 
(WENDT, 1998). The starting point for much of this research is to step 
backwards to ask what we mean by the study of governance. What is it 
about   a   particular   moment   in   world   history   in   which   the   world’s 
landmass is divided into a series of territorially bounded units that forge 
identities, establish administrative structures, and attempt to manage 
social, economic, and political challenges? 
The research enterprise laid out by interpretive approaches seeks 
to understand how the idea of governance emerged when and where it 
did,   how   it   is   understood   by   different   cultures   and   societies,   and 
whether or not a different organization of the world might avoid some of 
the horrors experienced under the current system of states (ANDERSON, 
1983). The process of statebuilding in its current form emerged in 
Europe, where capitalism, states, and Western culture came together to 
produce national-states – shared identity, centralized bureaucracies, and 
market expansion. Other countries had different initial conditions, and 
importing the core characteristics of nationhood from Europe created 
only diminished subtypes of Western European states, lacking shared 
identity, centralized bureaucracy, or consolidated markets. 
The point is that quantitative measures of governance, though 
useful   for   cross-national  comparison  and   hypothesis   testing,  fail   to 
capture the sequences and interactions associated with statebuilding 
(the qualitative view) or the culturally-bound and time-bound definition 
of Western European governance (the interpretive view).
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To apply the concept of governance to the way we design or 
allocate aid, it would make sense to keep qualitative and interpretive 
insights  in  mind. Most  importantly,   both of  these   approaches  take 
seriously not only the measurement of governance, but also the notion 
that it is wrapped closely into how it evolves over time in different 
contexts and from different perspectives.
Northern Impacts on Southern Governance
This   last   point   brings   us   to   the   real   oversight   in   current 
treatments   of   governance.   Most   attempts   to   measure   governance 
assume that it is something incomplete in developing countries, in which 
our job is to measure its shortcomings and offer suggestions on how to 
improve.   This   avoids   the   question   of   culpability   in   creating   poor 
governance, in which the North deserves plenty of the blame, and more 
generally fails to take into account the causal processes that produce 
weak governance.
This is not the place to list all the ways in which the North has 
intentionally undermined governance in the South. Such a review would 
have   to   begin   with   the   long   history   of   colonialism   and   ongoing 
interventions in which our leaders claimed (hollowly) to be beneficent. 
Northern countries have not been shy to undermine governance in 
places that are rich in natural resources or that occupy geopolitically 
important positions, nor do Northern countries decline to produce and 
proliferate the means of coercion to unsavory governments seeking to 
sustain their rule.
The discussion here is focused on the ways the North undermines 
governance in the South even when attempting to help. Often, this 
occurs because our understanding of governance is weak. One example 
is in terms of the international financial architecture, replete with high 
speed   transactions,   capital   account   liberalization,   and   permissive 
national   regulations.   Among   this   international   architecture   are   tax 
havens,   which   the   OECD   listed   as   places   in   which   secrecy,   low 
regulation, and low tax allow wealthy people in poor countries to hide 
their wealth, much of it gained corruptly. Some of these havens are in 
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the South (e.g. Cayman Islands), but others are in the North (e.g. Isle 
of Jersey), and they have expanded greatly in the last 25 years of 
capital   account   liberalization.   Further,   the   institutions   that   govern 
accounting   standards   and   could   regulate   illicit   capital   flows   are 
established and managed in the North, yet we have not equipped them 
to protect against governance decay in the South (OECD, 1998).
In addition, simply by engaging in certain types of trade with 
poor countries, we systematically undermine governance. Some of the 
products we buy are illegal, such as drugs and illegal diamonds, yet 
there is little sign that consumption in the North is dropping (NAIM, 
2006). Instead, we focus our efforts against these products in military 
solutions in the South, with predictable effects empowering military 
hierarchies within governments that already have weak civilian oversight 
and are poorly linked to civil society.
Even  trade  in  products  that  are not  illegal may do  little  to 
improve governance in the South. Consumption of natural resources, 
especially oil and gas, offers opportunities for huge profit, increasing in 
recent   years.   These   profits   are   easily   captured   by   states,   state 
enterprises,   and   their   leaders,   making   it   possible   for   Southern 
governments to finance exorbitant elite consumption, and if necessary 
repression, even as they ignore their citizens (ROSSER, 2006).
These  examples  suggest that the North has been  unable to 
regulate markets that harm governance in the South. More worrying is 
the   fact   that   even   when   we   explicitly   set   out   to   aid   Southern 
governance, we rarely succeed. Despite significant ink spilled on the 
topic,   donors   have   been   unable   to   coordinate   their   efforts   in   the 
countries   they   work,   complicating   administration   and   weakening 
governance (BIRDSALL, 2007). Nor have they brought donor funds into 
formal   government   processes,   preferring   instead   to   create   parallel 
processes and bureaucracies through project and program aid rather 
than   sector-wide   or   budget   support.  Research   into  the  relationship 
between donor fragmentation and governance  suggests that as aid 
increases,   donors   proliferate,   creating   more   negotiations,   more 
conditions, and more administrative costs (ACHARYA et al, 2006). This 
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burdens   weak   governments,   and   evidence   suggests   that   as   aid 
fragments, governance quality declines (KNACK and RAHMAN, 2004).
Another example of doing harm while attempting to do good is 
evident   in   the   area   of   tax.   The   international   aid   community   is 
increasingly   cognizant   of   the   importance   of   tax   for   promoting 
development. To this end, an increasing amount of resources are being 
spent on tax administration, tax reform, and tax capacity in the South. 
This is a good sign, and an improvement from the notion that less tax is 
better for development. Yet, at the same time as Northern countries 
contribute to tax capacity with their aid projects, they undercut it in 
several ways. 
Northern   companies,   often   aided   by   their   embassies   and 
governments, press for tax exemptions in the countries in which they do 
business (JACKSON, 2005). Where they cannot gain legal exemption, 
they evade, using mechanisms like transfer pricing. Such evasion has 
been estimated to cost developing countries approximately $250 billion 
a   year,   almost  four   times  the amount  needed  to  meet  the  MDGs 
(Millenium Development Goals). Much evasion is done by elites in the 
South, who are the holders of wealth, but it is also Northern companies 
that find ways not to pay tax in the South. Overseeing this evasion is 
made even more difficult by exemptions written into tax laws, such as 
exemptions for export zones.
It   is   not   only   Northern   companies   that   perforate   tax 
administration. Bilateral and multilateral aid organizations often press 
for exemptions on customs duties, VAT (value added tax), sales, excise, 
and other indirect taxes. Also, personnel are frequently exempted from 
income taxes and projects exempted from profit taxes. This can add up 
to a significant amount, for example it has been estimated at 18 percent 
of project financing in Niger and 10 percent of all tax revenue in 2002 
(INTERNATIONAL   TAX   DIALOGUE,   2006).   Developing   countries   are 
essentially forced to choose between protecting the integrity of their tax 
systems and accepting aid.
The   reasons   donors   claim   for   these   exemptions   have   been 
various. In some cases, internal policy prohibited using loans and aid to 
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finance taxes. The World Bank changed this policy in 2004, allowing 
payment of tax on reasonable expenses on a case by case basis, a 
policy subsequently adopted by the IADB (Interamerican Development 
Bank),   ADB   (Asian   Development   Bank),   and   French   Development 
Agency (INTERNATIONAL TAX DIALOGUE, 2006, p. 5).
Other donors have resisted. Some point to their desire for control 
over the goods purchased with each transfer. Better to build ten schools 
than to build nine and transfer the remaining amount to recipient 
governments in the form of taxes, even if those funds might be used to 
build   another   school.   This   violates   the   ongoing   debate   about   the 
fungibility of aid (DEVARAJAN and SWOOP, 1998), but may reflect donor 
desires to bypass governments they consider corrupt or unsavory. It 
may also reflect concerns related to the reasonableness of national tax 
legislation in terms of rates, discrimination against aid-financed projects, 
or the incidence of tax, which may fall on donors or recipients. 
These fears are probably more evident for bilateral donors, who 
are charged with conflicting imperatives.  On one hand, they seek to 
promote development in the countries in which they work. On the other 
hand, they must defend their allocations to the public in their own 
countries, and they may feel that aid to recipient coffers through tax is 
somehow  less defensible than  aid  directly  to  projects.  Further, aid 
agencies may be asked to pursue foreign policy imperatives, such as 
empowering civil society at the expense of government, precluding 
transfers that might be taxed.
Donors   would   not   insist   on   these   exemptions   if   they   took 
governance implications seriously. Exemptions increase the transaction 
costs of international assistance, both for donors and for recipients, as 
exemptions are often different from one donor to another  and one 
country   to   another.   Exemptions   also   complicate   tax   administration, 
making both compliance and enforcement more difficult. Exemptions to 
the VAT are particularly complicated, requiring credits or refunds in the 
case of zero ratings. Further, by opening holes in the tax system, 
exemptions provide opportunities for tax fraud and economic distortion. 
Politically, opening exemptions creates likely pressure for other actors to 
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press for their own exemptions, and donors pressing to eliminate other 
exemptions would do well to follow their own advice.
Most significantly, exemptions weaken tax capacity, removing 
funds from the public coffers that might otherwise be there. Donors are 
increasingly switching to budget support, suggesting greater confidence 
in recipient public finance management, yet they appear unwilling to pay 
taxes into those same systems of public finance management. If donors 
took their own role in shaping Southern governance seriously, they 
would not insist on exemptions that weaken the very governments they 
intend to aid.
Conclusion
Most donor attempts to incorporate governance into international 
aid is that governance in the South is weak and needs to be improved if 
markets are to develop. This is certainly true, but we do a disservice if 
we   limit   our   understanding   in   this   way.   There   are   times   when 
governments need to replace markets and times in which governments 
need to protect social norms from market operations. In addition, we 
need to be savvy about the variety of sequences and interactions by 
which states and markets are built and the unique socio-cultural ways in 
which governance is likely to operate at different places and times. None 
of this is particularly evident in the quantitative studies of governance 
favored by international donors.
Finally, we need to be far more aware of the way in which 
Northern actions, even guided by good intentions, weaken governance 
in the South. Certain kinds of trade and aid may actually undermine 
governance rather than enhance it. Of particular worry is Northern 
impact on taxes and tax administration in the South. Aid modalities, 
such as fragmented project aid, do little to enhance governance and 
may worsen it. Further, insisting on exemptions for materials, services, 
and   incomes   purchased   with   aid,   as   many   donors   do,   worsens 
governance.
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